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Abstract 
 
This note reconciles an on-going debate on the effect of foreign aid on corruption by 
introducing a previously missing heterogeneity dimension of aid. The relationship was 
estimated using dynamic system GMM and quantile regressions (QR). Results show that both 
narratives in the debate are correct, contingent on the type of development assistance. The 
QR results are robust to endogeneity when the independent variables of interest are 
instrumented with their first-lags.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Okada and Samreth (2012) reported the findings of their research on aid and corruption – for 
120 countries from 1999 to 2009 – in Economic Letters, where they concluded that aid 
reduces corruption and the effect is stronger for less corrupt countries. Asongu (2012) later 
passed a comment in Economics Bulletin that the findings of Okada and Samreth, though 
sufficient to aid policy and academic debates, may not be relevant in the African context. The 
main argument of the author is that when testing the model of Okada and Samreth (2012) in 
Africa, there is no sufficient and robust evidence to conclude that foreign aid reduces 
corruption. 
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We are yet to findany empirical study that has attempted to clarify this murky conclusions, at-
least for Africa; a continent with countries of somewhat homogenous economic and 
institutional structure (Asiedu, 2006; Efobi, 2014).Foreign aid for African countries, subsists 
as an important source of capital for development (Moyo, 2009). Perhaps, it is presumed that 
the ambiguity of the effect of aid that ispronounced in the existent literature can be resolved 
by considering aid distribution by sector. The aid data used by the previous studies were total, 
multilateral and bilateral aids.These types of foreign aid data maybe problematic especially 
because they capture aggregate aid data from different originating sources (bilateral and 
multilateral); but do not account for the actual usage of foreign aid, for which it is directed. 
Hence, they will most likely make the effect of foreign aid unclear (Selaya and Sunesen, 
2012). 
In this study, we considered aid flow by sector and the effect on corruption for a global 
sample of 100 countries (for which data was available) and for an African sub-sample. There 
may be several reasons to expect that disaggregating aid flow data by sector will provide a 
clearer perspective of the aid-corruption nexus. First, some forms of aidthat are directed 
towards some particular sectors are more likely to have a rent-seeking effect compared to 
others (Harms and Lutz, 2006; Kimura and Todo, 2010). For example, those aids directed at 
the development of social infrastructures like health and education may not be easily verified 
by donors in terms of the input requirement for a particular output. Therefore aid funds get 
lost due to the unbenevolent attitudes of the aid recipient government in efficiently disbursing 
such funds (Easterly, 2008). This is unlike other forms of aids that are directed at sectors with 
obvious outputs like infrastructure and programme related funds. Second,improving the 
external economics of scale for foreign investment inflow through infrastructural 
development and ensuring investment security, is a central national policy of developing 
countries (Bartels and Crombrugghe, 2009), especially aid recipients. In driving this policy, 
countries rely on huge capital investment, which most times are gotten from foreign aids. 
Constrained by the policy, the occurrence of rent seeking behaviour in aid recipient countries 
will likely be minimised for aids directed towards economic infrastructure and security; 
unlike aids to other sectors. 
We follow the suggestion of Selaya and Sunesen (2012) that – probably – a disaggregated aid 
data (aid flow by sector) will provide a robust evidence on what type of aid ‘fuels’ 
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corruption. An African sub-sample was included in the analysis in order to reach a clear 
conclusion on the implications of our study for a more specific sample.    
 
2. Empirical Approach 
The model(equation 1) follows the intuition of Asongu (2012) and Okada and Samreth 
(2012) to include the covariates log of real per capita GDP and democracy. The other 
variables are explained and described in Table 1 for a sample of 101 countries (2005-2013). 
.  
 (1) 
 
The empirical model was estimated using the Quantile Regression (QR) technique in order to 
examine the effect of the categories of aid across different levels of corruption. This favours 
the approach of Okada and Samreth (2012) and for comparison, the system GMM (SGMM) 
technique, as applied inAsongu(2012), was also estimated. 
 
Table 1: Data Description and Summary Statistics 
Variable Indicators Definition 
Total 
Sample 
N=101 
African 
sub-
Sample 
N=53 Source 
Corruption Corruption 
The extent to which public office is exercised for pri-
vate gains. It is scaled from -2.5 (high corruption) to 
+2.5 (low corruption). This measure was rescaled so 
that higher values signify more corruption. Thus 0 (low 
corruption) to 5 (high corruption) 2.935 3.091 
World Govern-
ance Indicators 
Foreign Aid 
Social Infrastruc-
ture & Services 
Foreign aid directed at human development purposes 
such as education, water supply and sanitation 0.055 0.074 
Organisation for 
Economic Cor-
poration and 
Development 
 
 
 
 
Economic Infra-
structure and 
Services 
Foreign aid directed at infrastructures like transport, 
communication and energy 0.016 0.024 
 
Production Sec-
tors 
Foreign aid directed at the productive sector like agri-
culture, industry, mining, construction, trade and tour-
ism 0.003 0.005 
 Multi sector 
Foreign aid directed at other sectorial development like 
rural development 0.003 0.004 
 
Programme Assis-
tance 
Foreign aid directed towards program related assis-
tance like food aid, disaster and war 0.007 0.009 
 Action on debt Aid directed towards debt relief 0.010 0.014  
Covariates GDP Per Capita The log of per capita GDP at 2005 constant USD 3103.33 1888.67 
World Devel-
opment Indica-
tors 
 Democracy 
Reflects the level of competiveness in the political 
system, the presence of electoral democracies and the 
freedom of political instruments like the press. Ranked 
from 1 (low democratic institution) to 7 (high democ-
ratic institution). 4.33 3.71 Freedom House 
Note: The mean values are presented in the Table. The values for the foreign aids are in GDP 2005 Constant 
USD ratio. 
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3. Empirical Result 
To begin the analysis, the multicollinearity test was first conducted (not reported for space) 
and there was no evidence of multicollinearity. Tables 2 and 3 present the SGMM and QR 
result for the entire sample and the African sub-sample. The signs and significant levels of 
the covariates follow theoretical expectations
1
that economic development and democratic 
institutions are significant determinants of corruption (also applicable forthe African sub-
sample). 
 
From the Tables, aids to social infrastructure and debt relief are significant inducers of 
corrupt practices in the sampled countries. The signs were consistently positive for the entire 
columns in Tables 2 and 3. Although these forms of aid spur rent-seeking behaviour, the 
impact is more visible for countries at the lower quantiles of corruption. The reason being 
that these forms of aid create an initial outward shock of public resources that pushes public 
officers to rent-seeking behaviour (Economides et al, 2008), especially when the usage of the 
aid cannot be verified. And with regard to debt relief, studies (e.g. Jalles, 2011; Cooray and 
Schneider, 2013) have shown that foreign debt enhances corruption. Therefore,aids directed 
towards debt relief in a country with debt problems, will further consolidate corruption in 
such country. No wonder the signs of this variable were consistently positive in all the 
columns.  
Aid directed towards the development of economic infrastructure, multi-sector and pro-
gramme assistance were consistently reducing corruption for both the entire sample and for 
the African countries (especially for countries in the 25
th
, 50
th
 and 75
th
 quantiles). These 
forms of aid disbursements are more likely to reduce rent-seeking tendencies of public offi-
cers because their utilisation can easily be verified through the presence of physical outputs 
(like infrastructural, sectorial development and program related assistance) and the improve-
ment of the investment environment of the recipient countries.  
 
 
 
                                                             
1
 (See Asongu, 2012; Okada and Samreth, 2012) 
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Table 2: Corruption and Foreign Aid 
 
SGMM Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
GDP Per capita 
-0.070 
(0.156) 
-0.020* 
(0.000) 
-0.013* 
(0.000) 
-0.080* 
(0.000) 
-0.044* 
(0.000) 
-0.035* 
(0.004) 
Democracy 
-0.028* 
(0.000) 
-0.124* 
(0.000) 
-0.098* 
(0.000) 
-0.157* 
(0.000) 
-0.153* 
(0.000) 
-0.151* 
(0.000) 
Aid to Social Infrastructure 
0.0312** 
(0.014) 
0.670* 
(0.000) 
0.295* 
(0.004) 
0.105 
(0.402) 
0.144*** 
(0.054) 
-0.076 
(0.114) 
Aid to Economic Infrastructure 
-0.0724 
(0.346) 
-3.918* 
(0.000) 
-1.072** 
(0.029) 
0.006 
(0.991) 
-0.103 
(0.801) 
-0.180 
(0.414) 
Aid to Productive sector 
0.354 
(0.640) 
4.335 
(0.106) 
2.820 
(0.383) 
1.942 
(0.532) 
2.329 
(0.357) 
6.039*** 
(0.063) 
Aid to Multi Sector 
-1.372 
(0.135) 
-33.587* 
(0.000) 
-22.038* 
(0.000) 
-2.067 
(0.659) 
5.872*** 
(0.073) 
0.476 
(0.942) 
Aid to Program Assistance 
-0.6912 
(0.121) 
-4.054** 
(0.026) 
-7.484* 
(0.000) 
-6.221* 
(0.000) 
-4.937* 
(0.000) 
-2.380** 
(0.015) 
Aid to Actions Related to debt 
0.278* 
(0.000) 
0.602* 
(0.002) 
0.529* 
(0.003) 
0.123 
(0.609) 
-0.235 
(0.213) 
0.297** 
(0.046) 
Corruption 
0.859* 
(0.000) --- --- --- --- --- 
Constant 
0.551 
(0.000) 
3.612 
(0.000) 
3.645 
(0.000) 
3.983 
(0.000) 
4.086 
(0.000) 
4.198 
(0.000) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.322 0.208 0.203 0.274 0.307 
AR (2) 0.693 --- --- --- --- --- 
Sargan 0.420 --- --- --- --- --- 
Instrument 36 --- --- --- --- --- 
Note: *, ** and *** signify 1, 5 and 10% significance levels. The values in parenthesis are the prob. values 
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Table 3: Corruption and Foreign Aid (African sub-Sample) 
 
(SGMM)  (Q10) (Q25) (Q50) (Q75) (Q90) 
GDP Per capita 
-0.043 
(0.004) 
-0.020* 
(0.000) 
-0.020* 
(0.000) 
-0.013* 
(0.000) 
-0.084* 
(0.000) 
-0.004* 
(0.001) 
Democracy 
-0.035* 
(0.000) 
-0.135* 
(0.000) 
-0.174* 
(0.000) 
-0.166* 
(0.000) 
-0.155* 
(0.000) 
-0.163* 
(0.000) 
Aid to Social Infrastructure 
0.037** 
(0.000) 
0.648* 
(0.000) 
0.484* 
(0.002) 
0.118 
(0.310) 
0.017 
(0.856) 
0.041 
(0.512) 
Aid to Economic Infrastructure 
-0.101** 
(0.048) 
-3.765* 
(0.000) 
-1.374* 
(0.009) 
0.123 
(0.811) 
-0.088 
(0.871) 
-0.446 
(0.286) 
Aid to Productive sector 
-0.434 
(0.499) 
4.813 
(0.218) 
3.766 
(0.372) 
1.578 
(0.658) 
2.102 
(0.525) 
0.849 
(0.730) 
Aid to Multi Sector 
-1.276*** 
(0.100) 
-36.391* 
(0.000) 
-37.111* 
(0.000) 
-19.815* 
(0.001) 
-18.229* 
(0.001) 
-10.050*** 
(0.062) 
Aid to Program Assistance 
-0.436 
(0.267) 
-2.230 
(0.345) 
  -3.442** 
(0.033) 
-4.453* 
(0.004) 
-2.374*** 
(0.100) 
-0.391 
(0.677) 
Aid to Actions Related to debt 
0.299* 
(0.000) 
0.618** 
(0.011) 
0.618* 
(0.001) 
0.426 
(0.236) 
0.098 
(0.573) 
0.164 
(0.215) 
Corruption 
0.834* 
(0.000) --- --- --- --- --- 
Constant 
0.551 
(0.000) 
3.634 
(0.000) 
3.948 
(0.000) 
4.056 
(0.000) 
4.188 
(0.000) 
4.295 
(0.000) 
Pseudo R
2
                   --- 0.394 0.291 0.256 0.277 0.302 
AR (2) 0.551 --- --- --- --- --- 
Sargan 0.725 --- --- --- --- --- 
Instrument 36 --- --- --- --- --- 
Note: *, ** and *** signify 1, 5 and 10% significance levels. The values in parenthesis are the prob. values 
 
Robustness 
Two robust checkswere conducted: the corruption measure by Transparency International 
was used as an explained variable. Table 1A (see appendix) presents the estimates; the signs 
and significance of the variables were consistent as in Tables 1 and 2.The second check was 
to correct for possible endogeneity in the QR by instrumenting the independent variables of 
interest with their first-lags. The result (not reported for space) also establishes the 
consistency of the signs and significance of the variables. These checks reverberate the fact 
that aid to social infrastructure and debt relief has an increasing effect on corruption; while 
aid to economic infrastructure, multi-sector and programme assistance has a reducing effect 
on corruption. 
4. Conclusion 
This note has taken a debate on the effect of foreign aid on institutions in recipient countries 
to another platform. We have introduced a dimension of aid heterogeneity to show that the 
sign of the effect is contingent on the type of aid. Our findings are robust by three 
fundamental factors motivating the debate, inter alia: endogeneity, sampled countries and 
estimation techniques.  
8 
 
References 
Asiedu, E. (2006). Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The role of natural resources, market 
size, government policy, institutions and political stability. World Economy, 29(1): 
63-72. 
Asongu, S. A. (2012). On the effect of foreign aid on corruption. Economics Bulletin. 32(3), 
pp. 2174-2180. 
Bartels, F.L., and Crombrugghe, S.A. (2009). FDI policy instruments: advantages and 
disadvantages. UNIDO Working Paper 01/2009. Retrieved November 17, 2014 
from 
http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Publications/RSF_DPR/WP012009_Eb
ook.pdf. 
Cooray, A., and Schneider, F. (2013). How does corruption affect public debt? An empirical 
analysis. Johannes Kepler University of Linz Working Paper No. 1322 December 
2013. Available at http://www.econ.jku.at/papers/2013/wp1322.pdf 
Easterly, W. (2008). Introduction: can’t take it anymore?  In Easterly, W., (Ed), reinventing 
foreign aid. Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Economides, G., Kalyvitis, S., and Philippopoulos, A. (2008). Does foreign aid distort 
incentives and hurt growth? Theory and evidence from 75 aid-recipient countries. 
Public Choice, 134: 463-488. 
Efobi, U. R. (2014). Politicians’ attributes and institutional quality in Africa: A focus on 
corruption. Journal of Economic Issues (Forthcoming in March 2014 Issue). 
Harms, P., and Lutz, M. (2006). Aid, governance and private foreigninvestment: Some 
puzzling findings for the 1990s. Economic Journal,116: 773–790. 
Jalles, J. T. (2011). The impact of democracy and corruption on the debt-growth relationship 
in developing countries. Journal of Economic Development. 36 (4): 41-72. 
Kimura, H., and Todo, Y. (2010). Is foreign aid a vanguard of FDI? A gravity equation 
approach. World Development, 38(4):482-497. 
Moyo, D. (2009). Dead aid: Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa. 
New York: Penguin Publishers. 
Okada, K., and Samreth, S. (2012). The effect of foreign aid on corruption: A quantile 
regression approach. Economic Letters, 11: 240-243. 
Selaya, P., and Sunesen, E.R. (2012). Does foreign aid increase foreign direct investment? 
WorldDevelopment, 40(11): 2155-2176. 
 
 
9 
 
Appendix 
Table 1A: Robustness (Using Corruption Perception Index as Explained Variables) 
 
All 
 
African 
sub-
Sample 
All 
 
African 
sub-
Sample 
All 
 
African 
sub-
Sample 
All 
 
African 
sub-
Sample 
All African 
sub-
Sample 
Q10 Q10 Q25 Q25 Q50 Q50 Q75 Q75 Q90 Q90 
GDP Per capita 
-0.041* 
(0.000) 
-0.047* 
(0.000) 
-0.036* 
(0.000) 
-0.044* 
(0.000) 
-0.021* 
(0.000) 
-0.017* 
(0.000) 
-0.010* 
(0.004) 
-0.017* 
(0.000) 
-0.084* 
(0.000) 
-0.092* 
(0.000) 
Democracy 
-0.176* 
(0.003) 
-0.194* 
(0.006) 
-0.206* 
(0.000) 
-0.280* 
(0.000) 
-0.210* 
(0.000) 
-0.267* 
(0.000) 
-0.221* 
(0.000) 
-0.266* 
(0.000) 
-0.186* 
(0.000) 
-0.232* 
(0.000) 
Aid to Social Infra-
structure 
0.918* 
(0.002) 
0.923* 
(0.002) 
0.609* 
(0.005) 
0.696* 
(0.000) 
0.404*** 
(0.095) 
0.408* 
(0.000) 
0.247*** 
(0.087) 
0.408* 
(0.000) 
0.078 
(0.386) 
0.394* 
(0.000) 
Aid to Economic 
Infrastructure 
-3.334** 
(0.022) 
-3.205** 
(0.039) 
-1.149 
(0.291) 
-1.020 
(0.248) 
-1.310 
(0.158) 
-1.691* 
(0.002) 
-1.115 
(0.160) 
-1.691* 
(0.002) 
-1.199* 
(0.001) 
-2.153* 
(0.000) 
Aid to Productive 
sector 
-3.727 
(0.562) 
-20.154** 
(0.037) 
-3.575 
(0.569) 
-1.696 
(0.792) 
0.980 
(0.861) 
4.757  
(0.196) 
6.877  
(0.154) 
4.758 
(0.196) 
5.618 
(0.296) 
4.941 
(0.355) 
Aid to Multi Sector 
-54.598* 
(0.000) 
-48.769* 
(0.002) 
-28.260* 
(0.002) 
-35.860* 
(0.001) 
-4.599 
(0.591) 
2.112  
(0.761) 
2.246  
(0.692) 
2.112 
(0.761) 
-1.002 
(0.783) 
-5.364 
(0.408) 
Aid to Program 
Assistance 
-6.839*** 
(0.073) 
-5.358 
(0.185) 
-10.330** 
(0.001) 
-9.368* 
(0.003) 
-5.372*** 
(0.057) 
-2.957** 
(0.041) 
-4.359** 
(0.040) 
-2.958** 
(0.041) 
-0.213 
(0.907) 
3.264*** 
(0.068) 
Aid to Actions 
Related to debt 
1.392* 
(0.010) 
1.464** 
(0.012) 
0.997 
(0.126) 
1.102* 
(0.002) 
0.255 
(0.556) 
0.153 
(0.534) 
0.118 
(0.690) 
0.154 
(0.534) 
0.385 
(0.166) 
0.424 
(0.154) 
Constant 
7.994* 
(0.000) 
8.059* 
(0.000) 
8.276* 
(0.000) 
8.566* 
(0.000) 
8.412* 
(0.000) 
8.796* 
(0.000) 
8.635* 
(0.000) 
8.796* 
(0.000) 
8.730* 
(0.000) 
8.798* 
(0.000) 
Pseudo R
2
             0.341 0.404 0.241 0.310 0.199 0.261 0.229 0.261 0.224 0.245 
Note: *, ** and *** signify 1, 5 and 10% significance levels. The values in parenthesis are the probability values. 
 
 
 
 
